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After Purdue, consent is a design question—not a footnote

The Supreme Court rejected the nonconsensual releases before it while expressly leaving questions about consensual releases open.

Read the holding before redesigning the plan

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma is a 2024 decision, not a newly enacted restructuring rule. Its significance remains practical: the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code did not authorize the nonconsensual releases of claims against the nondebtor Sacklers at issue in that plan. The opinion addresses the asserted authority under section 1123(b)(6), which permits appropriate plan provisions not inconsistent with the Code. Calling the decision a ban on every third-party release overstates what the Court decided.

The majority expressly reserved questions about consensual releases, including what qualifies as consent. That reservation matters to plan design. It is not an affirmative approval of every opt-out mechanism, nor a finding that silence always establishes agreement. An editorial assessment should preserve the difference between the decided question and the questions left for further consideration. The central thesis here is that consent belongs in the architecture of a proposal, not in a final sentence added after economics have been agreed.

Support for the plan is not necessarily consent to everything

A claimant may favor a distribution and still object to surrendering a separate claim against a nondebtor. Plan voting, consideration for a release, disclosure, and the scope of the claims being released are distinct subjects. Teams should identify the people affected, the rights addressed, and the mechanism by which agreement is requested. A summary showing aggregate plan support cannot by itself explain all of those decisions.

The competing concern is coordination. A contributor may demand broad protection in exchange for a substantial contribution, and individual choices can complicate a settlement. The Purdue dissent emphasizes the costs of losing the nonconsensual mechanism in mass-tort restructurings. That argument helps explain the commercial tension, but it is not the majority holding. A useful negotiation acknowledges both the value sought from settlement and the limits of the particular statutory authority the Court examined.

Build a release map alongside the distribution model

In practice, a release map should list the released parties, the claims affected, the proposed consent mechanism, the consideration, and the documents explaining each choice. A financial model should separately show which contributions depend on which protections. This makes it possible to assess whether a revised settlement remains viable without describing a disputed mechanism as already validated.

Reviewers also need version control: a change in the definition of released claims can alter rights without changing the headline distribution. Record the proposal, the objections, and the basis for any asserted consent. The implication is not to abandon coordinated settlements; it is to make their legal and economic dependencies visible. Purdue supplies a precise boundary on the nonconsensual relief before the Court and a clear reservation on consensual releases. Both parts should guide the conversation. Neither justifies pretending that every remaining consent question has a settled answer.

Primary sources

  1. [1] Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, No. 23–124 (2024) — Majority opinion, statutory analysis and concluding reservation; separate dissent ↗

    Holding on the nonconsensual nondebtor releases at issue, express reservation on consensual releases, and the dissent’s competing assessment.

  2. [2] 11 U.S.C. § 1123 — official GPO edition — § 1123(b)(6) ↗

    Plan provision authority, including the text of subsection (b)(6).